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Abstract
In this article, we analyze biological evolutionary systems to develop a framework for applying lessons of natural
adaptability to security concerns in society. Biological systems do not waste resources attempting to predict future
states of an inherently unpredictable and risk filled environment. Rather, biological organisms utilize adaptability to
respond efficiently to a wide range of potential challenges, not just those that are known or anticipated.
Adaptability is a powerful, but often misused concept. Typically, dimensionless claims about adaptability, such as,
“insurgents are more adaptable than us” are made without clear benchmarks against which to measure adaptability.
Our framework for adaptability, which was developed over the course of several multi-disciplinary working groups
of life scientists and security practitioners focused on what we can learn about security from biological systems, can
be applied broadly to societal approaches to improving security.
Here we outline the “rules of engagement” for natural adaptable systems, which state that evolutionary systems do
not predict, plan, or perfect the development of biological organisms. Given these constraints, we then outline four
nearly universal features of adaptable biological organisms:
1. They are organized semi-autonomously with little central control
2. They learn from success
3. They use information to mitigate uncertainty
4. They extend their natural adaptability by engaging in a diverse range of symbiotic partnerships
For each of these attributes we identify how they work in nature and how we have failed to apply them in our
responses to security concerns. Finally, we describe a pathway by which adaptable strategies can be incorporated
into security analysis, planning and implementation.
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Review
The Editors of this Special Issue have acknowledged that
much effort has been spent in developing informatics
approaches to predicting security threats with little to
show for it. One of the charges of this Issue, then, was to
show how biologically inspired approaches might im-
prove predictability. As a biologist and biological warfare
expert, however, we argue the opposite, that unpredict-
ability should the starting point of any discussion about
how biological systems can aid informatics approaches to
security. This is because the fundamental commonality
between human security problems and security problems
faced by the rest of the biological world is that risks in
the environment are ubiquitous and unpredictable.
Biological organisms have not responded to this un-
predictability by wasting resources attempting to make
predictions. Indeed, adaptable systems in nature haven’t
proven their record of success by demonstrating a high
percentage of predictions that turned out to be correct,
but rather by surviving and reproducing for 3.5 billion
years and by diversifying into tens of millions of extant
species living in the coldest, hottest, deepest, highest and
most unpredictable niches on Earth. They have all done
this by mastering the craft of adaptability. Natural adapt-
ability is fundamentally different from merely reacting to
a crisis (which is too late) or attempting to predict the
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next crisis (which is almost certain to fail, especially in
species like humans when complex behaviors are
involved). Adaptability controls the space between reac-
tion and prediction, providing an inherent ability to
respond efficiently to a wide range of potential
challenges-not just those that are known or anticipated-
as they arise in their environment.
Although, “adaptability” is now being thrown around
as a popular buzzword among various security agencies
and analysts, this potentially powerful concept is treated
rather carelessly. Guidance on exactly what adaptability
is and how it can be adopted in practice has been lack-
ing. It is often presented as an ultimate, but ill-defined
goal to attain. For example, after a perceived failure in
security operations, it is argued that the agency in
charge “needs to become more adaptable” with little
guidance as to what more adaptable would look like.
Likewise, dimensionless claims about adaptability, such
as, “insurgents are more adaptable than us” are made
without clear guidelines of how to measure adaptability.
Here we present a framework called “Natural Secur-
ity”, that places adaptability at the heart of understand-
ing, and mounting effective responses to security
threats, whatever form they take [1-3]. Natural Security
can be viewed as a set of analytical and prescriptive tools
that are based in the recognition that the function of
adaptability has fundamental roots that go back as far in
Earth's history as life itself. By deeply examining life his-
tory, including human evolution, we can discover proven
solutions to surviving in a hostile and unpredictable
world. These solutions have already been developed over
3.5 billion years of life history, but have largely gone un-
examined in the analysis, planning and practice of secur-
ity in modern human society. Insights from natural
adaptive systems give us both clarity on our past survival
as a species and guidance for dealing with unpredictable
threats in the future. The concept of adaptability encom-
passes a broad diversity of security solutions in nature
and accordingly provides a single unified framework for
analyzing and guiding responses to the unpredictable
threats. The Natural Security framework can be used re-
gardless of the approach to security, but it will be par-
ticularly useful in an informatics context because—like
the natural systems it was distilled from—it can improve
its performance through a recursive process of trans-
forming multitudes of observational data into ever more
sharply defined responses to environmental change.
We developed this framework from a multi-year,
multi-disciplinary working group we initiated in 2005 at
the National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthe-
sis (NCEAS) that was fueled by a simple question: “what
can we learn from biological organisms and evolution
about how to be more adaptable to societal security con-
cerns?” Participants in these discussions included life
scientists from many fields including evolutionary biol-
ogy, anthropology, psychology, network analysis and be-
havioral ecologists, along with security analysts, first
responders, military and public health experts. Because
we are not informatics experts, we make no attempt
here to design algorithms or present quantitative models
to bear out our biologically inspired framework for
adaptability. Nonetheless, our outsider perspectives
means that we come with no preconceived agenda or
favored informatics approaches. Rather we offer our key
findings from an in-depth study of natural systems as an
adaptable framework from which multiple types of
approaches, including more effective data mining,
“crowd sourcing”, and network analyses, can be built.
Here we present this framework in three parts. First
we discuss the key rules of engagement that all biological
systems operate under. Then we drill down into how
adaptable systems work, pulling out four interrelated
concepts focused on:
1. How adaptable systems are organized
2. How they learn
3. How they use information to mitigate uncertainty
4. How they extend their adaptable capacities through
symbiotic relationships
Finally, we make recommendations as to how to apply
these lessons and create adaptable security systems that
closely mimic natural adaptive systems without forcing a
complete reorganization of security infrastructure or
violating common human ethical norms.
Adaptable systems: the rules of engagement
If there are rules (beyond elementary thermodynamics)
under which biological evolution, and by extension the
organisms that arise through evolutionary processes,
works they amount to a prohibition against three “P’s”.
That is, evolution doesn’t predict, doesn’t plan, and
doesn’t perfect biological organisms.
First, despite 150 years of modern evolutionary biol-
ogy, biologists are almost never able to predict an evolu-
tionary event beyond simple generalizations like
“bacteria will evolve resistance to antibiotics”. Evolved
adaptable organisms themselves don’t make predictions
simply because the complex world of continually chan-
ging and interacting biological organisms acting within
the dynamic and networked matrix of biogeochemical
stocks and flows that they live in is not predictable. At
best organisms anticipate events that come in well
defined cycles—thus, many organisms have strong “cir-
cadian rhythms” that allow them to respond to light/
dark cycles and many coastal marine organisms move in
anticipation of tidal rhythms. They may also use their
keen sensory abilities and stored sensory observations to
Sagarin and Taylor Security Informatics 2012, 1:14 Page 2 of 9
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/1/1/14
act in anticipation of unusual events as evidenced by
wild and domestic animals responding to the 2004
Indian Ocean Boxing Day tsunami well in advance of
humans living in the same area [4], but this is not pre-
dicting an unknown future event. Making and respond-
ing to predictions that are very unlikely to be correct is
a waste of resources that are better spent finding food,
avoiding predators and mating. The 2011 tsunami in
Japan and its devastating effects on the nuclear power
infrastructure, the Arab spring, and the outbreak of anti-
biotic resistant E. coli in Europe were all threats to se-
curity that were possible to anticipate (along with an
almost infinite number of other security threats that did
not come to pass during the previous year) but impos-
sible to predict. It has been argued that all of the most
destabilizing political, economic, and environmental
events in human history have been unpredictable [5].
Second, there is no scientific evidence to support the
notion that evolved biological systems are “intelligently
designed” or planned in advance. There are numerous
natural examples to illustrate this point, but one of the
most striking is the ocean sunfish Mola mola. This large
flattened fish slowly plies the surface waters of the Paci-
fic sucking jellyfish through an undersized mouth, pad-
dling with two flippers attached to a raggedly flat back
end that looks as if the fish’s proper tail was bitten off. If
some intelligent designer decided to create a fish, it
would never make a Mola. Yet, despite its scant resem-
blance to our common image of a fish, the Mola has sur-
vived as a fish for millennia because it adapted to its
environment through time and ultimately found a niche
that no other organism had capitalized upon. An un-
likely creature such as the Mola emerged because the
process of evolution doesn’t tend toward any endpoint.
It doesn’t try to make an eye or an immune system or a
beautiful fish. Evolution proceeds by solving survival
problems as they arise. Security systems in society, by
contrast, are littered with meticulously planned
designs—the Maginot Line comes to mind—that were
entirely unable to solve emerging threats from the
environment.
Finally, a common misconception about evolution is
that it is about seeking perfection, as encapsulated in the
term “survival of the fittest”. This interpretation is
infused in misguided applications of Darwinian thought
such as eugenics, and it is reflected in more legitimate
societal applications such as business performance ana-
lysis where “optimization” is seen as a laudable goal. In
fact, evolution is neither about survival of the “fittest”
nor about optimizing systems. It just doesn’t matter how
close the organism is to its own theoretically optimal
performance. It might work at 25% of its capacity and
still survive just fine in a given environment. There is, in
fact, no metric with which to measure how perfect or
how optimal a given organism is. Would a coyote that
produces five pups be more perfect if it could produce
six? Not necessarily if it can’t care for all six in that par-
ticular spring. Is a counter-terrorism strategy optimal if
no terrorist attack occurred during its first five years of
operation? Not if the same result could have been
accrued using half the resources. Even the science of try-
ing to predict optimality in organisms has proved itself
to be almost comically wrong in case after case. For ex-
ample, the first time depth sensors were attached to a
live penguin, the animal dove to depths greatly exceed-
ing its optimal performance as determined in painstak-
ing applications of mathematical theory and laboratory
physiological experiments [6].
The successful results of evolution are organisms that
are not perfect, but “good enough” to survive and repro-
duce themselves. In society when we try to design per-
fect solutions to security problems we inevitably waste
enormous amounts of resources while at best only mar-
ginally improving our security. For example, screening
100% of passengers at airports or people entering sensi-
tive buildings is an attempt at creating a perfect security
barrier that has failed to stop accidental smuggling of
contraband, deliberate informal and formal test beaches,
and actual terrorists such as Richard Reid and Umar
Abdulmutallab. Likewise cyber security experts acknow-
ledge that forty years of attempting to perfect “firewall”
type security systems has only resulted in a cyber infra-
structure that is more vulnerable than ever and becomes
especially prone to damage once an attacker inevitably
gets inside the security wall [7].
How adaptable systems work
The rules of engagement listed above would seem to de-
flate most of our enthusiastic responses to security pro-
blems. Almost all calls for improved security systems
implore us to improve predictability. Making a security
“plan” provides concrete evidence that we have done
something to prepare us for a crisis. And the need to
“optimize” rolls off the tongues of business gurus and se-
curity experts with scarcely a second thought to the im-
practicability of the concept. Yet biological systems,
including humans themselves, have operated under de
facto prohibitions against predicting, planning and per-
fecting all the while surviving, thriving and improving
their performance for billions of years. Remarkably, des-
pite the massive diversity of forms that have resulted
from this vast evolutionary history, just a small number
of simple themes adequately capture how adaptability is
utilized in most organisms. Adopting these themes in
our own practice will help put us on a pathway towards
more adaptable social systems that can become self sus-
taining, rather than maintained through a centrally
planned model.
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Organizing to adapt
The organization of adaptable systems relies on a large
number of semi-autonomous agents to sense and re-
spond to environmental change with little central con-
trol [8,9]. Organisms have done this by evolving
specialized organs, developing highly sensitive sensory
mechanisms, specializing functions into differentiated
clones, and organizing nerve cells into networked clus-
ters operating closest to the environmental interaction.
An octopus uses millions of cells spread across the sur-
face of its skin to sense and respond to the world
around, instantly changing shape and color to perfectly
match each cells’ immediate surroundings. Our own im-
mune system, which can instantly identify and mount a
response to an invading pathogen with no guidance from
our central brain, is an exemplar of this type of
organization.
Decentralized and distributed organizational systems
are adaptable for three main reasons. First, multiple sen-
sors all looking or experiencing the environment from
their own perspective provide more opportunities to
identify unusual changes and unexploited opportunities.
When we let a single entity take complete charge of se-
curity, the number of observers goes down, along with
the probability of identifying a threat to security. Second,
multiple agents committed to the security mission in
their own local area create opportunities to specialize
tasks, so that energy isn’t wasted in having every part of
the organism doing the same things, but rather those
doing the most important things (e.g., providing defense
when hostile enemies are around or reproducing when
populations are low) get the resources to replicate their
activities. We have often ignored this lesson in distribut-
ing resources for homeland security. Recently, state Gov-
ernors were appalled to find that to receive Federal
funding from the Department of Homeland Security,
they had to commit 25% of their budgets to defense
against Improvised Explosive Devices [10]—a huge threat
in foreign conflicts, but extremely low in importance
relative to other threats facing domestic states. Third,
distributed sensors respond to the most immediate en-
vironmental conditions in time and space—they see the
environment for what it “is” rather than what it “should”
be according to some preconceived notion. This way,
the octopus that is transferred from its natural setting to
a lab tank isn’t paralyzed by the new environment. It
simply uses its eight tentacles and thousands of suckers
(which can smell) to feel out its new surroundings,
search for food, or find an escape route.
Numerous recent societal examples illustrate that we
are capable of creating such distributed organizational
systems. Small bottom-up organizations around the
world are rapidly becoming far more effective at pro-
moting environment protection and social justice than
the huge centralized and much better funded NGOs and
governments. Businessman and social activist Paul Haw-
ken likens this growing network of local organizations to
an immune system, in that it is widely distributed yet
connected, and grows larger not for its own sake, but
through the process of local populations identifying add-
itional needs and replicating their successful efforts [11].
Similarly, Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom have
chronicled the struggles of traditional centralized busi-
ness models in competing with new distributed networks
of competitors. For example, highly decentralized music
file sharing networks—typically run by college students
on hundreds or thousands of independent machines that
are constantly changing—have been successful at eluding
the copyright protection efforts of the much better
funded and highly centralized Recording Industry Asso-
ciation of America [12]. Most impressively, Google Flu
Trends, an application that tracks users’ “Googling”
words associated with the flu, such as “flu symptoms”,
“flu remedies”, and “flu vaccines”, tightly matches the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) offi-
cial flu tracking, which is based on Doctor and hospital
survey data that have to be returned to and compiled by
the CDC, with one major difference. The decentralized
Google Flu provided data on outbreaks two weeks faster
than the centralized CDC data [13]. When it comes to
the rapidly mutating flu virus, two weeks advance notice
could easily be the difference between a mild nuisance
and a global pandemic.
Learning from success
Having an adaptable organization allows adaptable sys-
tems to learn through a process of selection to respond
effectively to threats. Learning is essentially a force of
nature that acts across generations and within an organ-
ism’s own lifetime. Even in relatively simple organisms,
learning sets off a continual process of escalating threats
and adaptive defenses. Birds learn that certain color pat-
terns in spiders indicate the presence of poison and they
avoid those patterns. Through time, other non-
poisonous spiders develop the color patterns of the poi-
sonous types and thus avoid being eaten themselves; a
selectively induced learning passed down through gen-
erations. Humans’ ability to learn is advanced relative to
most other species and accelerated through a high de-
gree of parental care, symbolic language, and communi-
cation networks that allow us to learn from
environmental threats without actually experiencing
them [14].
Natural learning is driven by Darwinian selection,
a simple, yet powerful process that relies on just three
elements—variation, selection, and reproduction of suc-
cessful variants. Dominic Johnson, a member of our
Natural Security working group, has shown that the
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different selective forces acting on insurgents compared
to US war fighters help to explain the relative lack of im-
provement in killing or capturing insurgents during the
Iraq conflict [15]. In essence, insurgents come from a
more variable population in terms of their origins and
tactics and they are under stronger selection because
they are killed or captured in much greater numbers
than US forces, which results in the concentration and
replication (through recruitment and training by the sur-
vivors) of stronger insurgents through time.
The selective learning process in nature acts on both
failures and successes, but for an individual, learning
from failure is literally a dead end--only success is
rewarded by allowing a gene or a cell or an individual to
grow and replicate itself. In nature, success is the cre-
ative process that recursively builds yet further suc-
cesses. By contrast, we are unduly enamored, especially
in the literature on organizational effectiveness, of the
concept of “learning from failure” [16,17]. It is necessary
for our security responses to learn from past failures,
but we have placed far too little emphasis on learning
from past successes. “After Action” reports are filled
with perceived failures, but consistently underplay op-
portunities to identify and replicate the best perfor-
mances. Our failure to learn from success is clear in
disaster response, where the one unqualified success of
the Hurricane Katrina response, the Coast Guard’s con-
tainment and cleanup of nearly 9 million gallons of oil
under logistically difficult circumstances, went almost
completely unnoticed. The massive Townsend After Ac-
tion report on Katrina does not mention oil spill
cleanup, but it does identify 17 “Critical Challenges”, 125
recommendations, and 243 action items, covering every-
thing from Search and Rescue to transportation infra-
structure to proper routing of foreign assistance [18].
None of these lessons from failure were all that useful
for the next great Gulf disaster—the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil well blowout—but lessons from the oil con-
tainment success likely would have been.
Using information to mitigate uncertainty
Not surprisingly, there are myriad ways adaptable sys-
tems learn to use information from the environment,
but the wide array of natural information use coalesces
around a single overarching theme: organisms seek to
reduce uncertainty for themselves and increase uncer-
tainty for their adversaries. The need to create uncer-
tainty for an adversary and reduce uncertainty for
oneself and one’s allies explains many complex behaviors
in nature. Birds flock to cause uncertainty for a predator
about any individual’s vulnerability, while predators use
camouflage to create uncertainty about when and from
where their attack will come. Periodical cicadas, which
emerge en masse to mate and deposit eggs after periods
of 7, 13, or 17 years lying dormant underground have
evolved to exploit the mathematical uncertainty of prime
numbers to avoid emerging during banner years for pre-
dators [19].
Another way organisms mitigate uncertainty through
information is by broadcasting signals either from one
individual member of a species to another or from one
species to another species. While some of this signaling
is deceptive (like an animal whose coloration mimics a
poisonous animal) or secretive (cuttlefish send signals to
one another in polarized light bursts), a counterintuitive
outcome in natural information use is the ubiquity of
“honest” signaling. Male peacocks make honest signals
to females through the decoration of their feathers
which gets more opulent and bright the more energy
they are able to put into their display. A malnourished
peacock, which would make a less fit mate, cannot put
the energy into making a flashy signal. Deceptive signals,
like the budget-strapped Argentine jail that staffed guard
towers with mannequins, are quickly discovered as
fraudulent under exposure (several prisoners promptly
escaped) [20]. When signaling to enemy predators—a
common practice that eliminates uncertainty by letting
the predator know the prey is aware of its presence--
organisms must not only signal honestly (or be able to
maintain a bluff ), but must have a keen sense of how
their signal will be received. Ground squirrels for ex-
ample, will make shrill alarm calls aimed at deterring
bird and mammal predators (who can hear) but when
faced with a snake (which doesn’t hear), they don’t call,
but rather puff up and shake their tails. If that snake
happens to be a rattlesnake rather than a gopher snake,
the squirrel also heats up its tail because rattlesnakes are
unique in that they perceive infrared radiation [21].
By contrast, most of the security screening we conduct
tragically reverses the uncertainty rule of nature—that is,
it makes life less uncertain for our adversaries and more
uncertain for ourselves. When we widely advertise what
we are looking for and how we are looking for it in se-
curity screening (which we must do when we order
everyone passing through security to be screened in an
identical fashion), our adversaries greatly reduce their
uncertainty. They now know exactly what is being
looked for and they can then work on adapting ways to
get around the screening.
At the same time we increase our own uncertainty by
constantly crying “predator!” (or, as the case may be,
“terrorist!”) which continually erodes our confidence that
anyone really knows what is going on. Over the decade
that TSA used its color coded Homeland Security
Threat Level Advisory System--the five color warning
scheme prominently displayed in airports and other pub-
lic facilities—it rarely changed the warning level. In air-
ports, the threat level stayed constantly at “Orange”
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from August 2006 until the program’s demise five years
later. This was not a convincing message to our enemies
that we actually did know what they were up to, and it
also didn’t give clear information to the population it
was supposed to protect.
Extending adaptation through symbiosis
When faced with the limits of their own abilities, adapt-
able systems use symbiosis to extend their adaptive cap-
acity. Symbiotic relationships are diverse and ubiquitous
in nature, including relationships between species – such
as predatory fish and much smaller fish – that would ap-
pear to have no reason to cooperate. Indeed, many sym-
biotic relationships arise out of previously antagonistic
relationships. Symbiotic relationships can confer mul-
tiple benefits to the larger environment. Studies on mon-
keys and apes show that when individuals are coerced to
begin a cooperative relationship (to help one another get
food, for example), conflict overall between the animals
is reduced [22]. Small coral reef fish known as wrasses
set up “cleaning stations” where large fish can have their
parasites cleaned off, provided they don’t eat the smaller
fish. The large fish in this symbiosis are not only less ag-
gressive to their cleaning partners, but towards all other
fish on the reef as well [23]. Biological research is in-
creasingly concluding that humans are naturally co-
operative, but mutually beneficial symbiotic relationships
are vastly underutilized as a security strategy.
Symbiotic partnerships between US forces and even
previously hostile Iraqi groups marked a turning point in
the IED threat there. A precipitous decline in IED attacks
in summer 2007 directly followed an increase in tips
about bombs and bomb makers to US forces [1]. The
power of symbiotic partnerships is more fully realized in
the disease surveillance networks being facilitated by co-
author Taylor. These symbiotic partnerships--between
Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians [24], as well as prac-
titioners from six traditionally hostile countries on the
Mekong River—were created to identify and mitigate dis-
ease outbreaks on whatever side of borders they occur.
Network practitioners share data, technologies, and tech-
niques. These networks weren’t mandated by high levels
of government or through international treaties, but have
emerged from the ground up as local, adaptive responses
to a real need to protect regional food supplies and
human health from pathogens that know no borders.
The networks were also not designed to tackle the much
larger and complex issues of creating peace between their
member states, but by providing indispensible capacities
to member states that are only available through symbi-
osis, they very well may be an incentive to further peace
agreements. Finally, their success, like a properly func-
tioning evolutionary feedback cycle, has encouraged fur-
ther success. Large corporations such as IBM have been
impressed by these networks and have contributed with
vital database technology. Better still, new consortia are
being replicated, for example in southern Africa, based
on the successful performance of the original Middle
East Consortium for Infectious Disease Surveillance.
Creating an adaptable cascade
A paradox of adaptation when applied to human social
systems is that individual humans and small groups of
humans appear to be more adaptable to security chal-
lenges than the organizations they design to deal with
security. For example, troops on the ground in Iraq, op-
erating as multiple semi-independent sensors, quickly
identified IEDs as the greatest threat to their security
and they adopted tactics and armor as best as they were
able with the resources they had. By contrast, it took the
Department of Defense, with vast resources, several
years to bring mine resistant vehicles (MRAP) to Iraq,
by which time over 1500 US soldiers and Marines had
died due to IEDs [1]. Arguably, those same MRAP vehi-
cles are poorly adapted for conditions in Afghanistan,
where they force warfighters into predictable routes and
can be easily outmaneuvered by enemies in lighter and
considerably cheaper second hand Toyota pickups. In
other words, we “intelligently design” security systems
that are less adaptable to security threats than the
humans for which they are intended.
This disconnect can be paralyzing. We tend to assume
that because most security systems pass through large
centralized bureaucracies that they can never be made
to be adaptable. But that view makes the mistake of
looking for a complete or perfect solution. The massive
diversification of life and its continual change is the re-
sult of small, imperfect mutations and changes at the
scale of molecules that improved on ancestral solutions
to problems. Nor does this change need to take millions
of years or generations. We now know that evolution
can occur quite rapidly, and as human designers of se-
curity systems, we can speed up the process further by
creating our own evolutionary processes and providing
our own sources of selection.
The key is creating an adaptable cascade, in which
some small adaptable actions set off other adaptable
actions that ultimately lead to a system that generates its
own momentum toward ever more adaptability. The first
step for creating an adaptable cascade is to transform
whatever sounds like an order into a challenge and to
create whole new challenges. An order is anything cre-
ated by a small elite group (or powerful individual) that
is forced upon anyone else in the group under the ex-
pectation that it will be followed to the letter. A chal-
lenge, by contrast is an open solicitation for help to
solve an identified problem. Issuing a challenge is not
about relinquishing control or completely overturning
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an existing hierarchy. The person or group issuing the
challenge still has the power to design it, shape the
incentives that will attract people to it, set the rules, and
determine who will get to participate in the challenge. In
other words, switching to a mode of issuing challenges
doesn’t have to radically alter the structure or power dy-
namics of a given organization. At the same time it can
radically alter how problems are solved. Challenges work
because they emulate the natural adaptive organization
of nature where multiple semi-independent agents are
solving problems where they occur. In more human
terms they give ownership of a problem to the people
who have to work on solving it.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) has effectively used low cost challenges given
openly to citizens to solve technological problems, such
as designing a completely autonomous land vehicle, and
informational problems, such as minimizing the time to
find lost assets in a large geographic area. With both
these types of challenges DARPA has reaped multiple ef-
fective solutions at a miniscule cost and in a rapid time
frame that has in some cases even surprised the DARPA
challenge organizers.
As individuals work on a challenge and share their
results, learning outcomes will improve as an adaptive
cascade takes its course. Like learning in nature, learning
will happen automatically as an organization becomes
more adaptable. Too many business books and corpor-
ate seminars and consultants try to institutionalize learn-
ing, but if an organization is not learning, it is not
because it hasn’t discovered some playbook on how to
learn. Any plan for learning will become redundant as
an organization becomes adaptable. Sagarin, for ex-
ample, has found that experimental undergraduate
teaching methods in which students are challenged to
create the course syllabus, rather than be ordered to fol-
low the “intelligently designed” syllabus of the professor,
result in much greater participation and better learning
outcomes (Sagarin and Turnipseed, unpublished data).
If an adaptable problem solving system is in place, the
incentives necessary to bring out and replicate success
are in material terms fairly minor, but they must be
aligned correctly. Employees who respond to 3M’s “Pol-
lution Prevention Pays” challenge, which has reduced
over a billion tons of pollution since its inception in the
late 1970s and has saved the company over $3 billion,
get little more than a statement of recognition from cor-
porate headquarters. Yet, to date over 8,100 employee
directed pollution reduction projects have been recog-
nized by 3M [25]. In order to continually keep incentives
aligned, documenting the level of response to different
challenges (is interest growing or waning, for example)
is as important as documenting the content of the
responses themselves.
Among organizations that are used to planning, a con-
cern about issuing open challenges is that there is a lot
of uncertainty about what will come back in response. In
an ecological context, this can be seen as an asset. The
uncertainty that multiple problem solvers bring with
them is its own form of naturally emerging diversity,
which provides rich ground for adaptation. Moreover, by
monitoring the adaptive cascade closely, a challenge or-
ganizer can mitigate uncertainty by changing the para-
meters of the challenge as needed. For example, DARPA
could use results of their open challenges to seed a sec-
ond generation of challenges that are more narrowly
issued to participants with security clearances.
Invariably, new symbiotic partnerships will be borne
out of the adaptive cascade. Although symbiotic partner-
ships are essential to adaptation, creating these partner-
ships cannot be done as a mandate from the top down.
The government has mandated many “interagency task
forces” designed to create partnerships between agencies
that rarely talked to one another. But with a narrow set
of allowable tasks and a required number of annual
meetings, these task forces tend to become exercises in
which representatives from each member agency, who
have little power to make decisions, come to check off a
box. Real symbiosis arises automatically when different
entities find out that they can solve imminent problems
better together than they could on their own. Symbiotic
relationships may flash away as quickly as they were
formed, or they may become long term partnerships, if
both parties find at least some additional benefit from
staying together. In this sense the central challenge of
the adaptive cascade becomes the catalyst that new sym-
biotic partnerships are built around. The more perspec-
tives that are brought in to address the challenge, the
more opportunities to develop new symbiotic relation-
ships emerge.
Finally, adaptive pathways are not valuable if created
solely within a theoretical or experimental environment.
All the ethical, political, economic and social factors that
apply to any policy discussion should be brought to bear
when applying biologically inspired ideas to security in
societal systems. These factors are not unlike the many
constraints that biological organisms have no choice but
to acknowledge and deal with in order to survive. Fortu-
nately, humans have an unmatched ability as a species
to look at the environment both from an immediate per-
spective and from a detached viewpoint. This allows us
to deliberately choose the types of adaptable strategies
we want to employ and to modify them as needed to fit
the constraints of our own social environment.
Conclusions
Our biologically inspired approach to security, which is
based on the collective observations of natural adaptive
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systems by generations of naturalists and life scientists,
provides a framework on top of which can be a lain a
number of informatics approaches to solving security
challenges. Although we do not advocate any one
informatics-based approach, we can distill several gen-
eral lessons for biologically inspired security informatics.
The finding that biological systems use de-centralized
organization to sense and respond to environmental
change suggests that informatics approaches will be
most effective when the data used to train or validate
models are gathered by multiple quasi-independent
sources. Models should also be weighted toward reward-
ing successes by including recursive feedback elements
that replicate successful tests, because learning from
success generates a creative process of problem solving
in adaptive systems. Biological models suggest that how
information is projected is as important as how it is
received and indeed senders and receivers of information
are locked in a mutually interdependent evolutionary
trajectory. In this regard, informatics approaches must
be cognizant that the nature of information itself is con-
tinually changing along with the environment in which
that information resides. Finally, informatics approaches
should not underestimate the power and potential scope
of symbiotic relationships. Such relationships can, for
example, completely change network topologies and can
form bridges between previously isolated networks. We
believe that a number of approaches—technological, in-
formational, psychological and political—will be neces-
sary to address security challenges in societal systems.
By referring all these approaches to a common under-
lying force—the need to maintain adaptability in a dy-
namic and unpredictable world—we can develop a
common language and metrics with which to measure
their effectiveness.
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